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Preferential trade agreements and agricultural trade 
liberalization in Asia and the Pacific 
 
 
Dr Mia Mikic1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper addresses preferential trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific with the objective of 
identifying their characteristics which can be useful in assessing the effects of their 
implementation. The paper relies mostly on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements 
Database (APTIAD) in sourcing data and information for analysis. On 26 February 2007 
APTIAD was tracking 125 preferential trade agreements one party of which was a member of 
ESCAP.  Eighty seven of those agreements of various types are in force, 62 of them being 
bilateral agreements, 11 regional trade agreements (RTAs), and 11 country-bloc agreements (the 
residual is made up of agreements of different scope, i.e.  global and country-plurilateral.). The 
paper utilizes information on membership and coverage of agreements as well as statistical data 
on goods trade flows in discussing selected important aspects of preferential trade in Asia and the 
Pacific: (a) the rapid proliferation of preferential trade and revealed preference for bilateral links; 
(b) strong tolerance for engagement in multiple trade agreements with the same trading partner; 
and (c) reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization in merchandise trade, or expose other 
than industrial goods trade areas to preferential liberalization. The extent of liberalization of trade 
in agricultural goods through the PTAs in the region is focus of a separate section which also 
briefly discusses “new” arguments for agricultural trade protectionism in developing countries. 
Penultimate section discusses the ways in which PTAs could be harnessed to work as 
complementary with the multilateral trading regime. Some policy recommendations are offered as 
well.   
 
JEL Classification: D78; F13; F14; F15  
 
Keywords:  preferential trade, multilateral liberalization, bilateral trade agreements, regional trade 
agreements, agriculture trade, Asia, Pacific, APTIAD. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on the “Mapping of preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific” by the same author issued as the 
TID Staff Working Paper No 1/2007. The valuable research assistance provided by Dandan Jian (University of 
Michigan) during her internship with the Trade Policy Section in data collection is gratefully acknowledged. The 
author also expresses her gratitude to the Development Seminar participants held at ESCAP, where an earlier version of 
this paper was presented with Tiziana Bonapace, for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors and omissions 
are to be attributed to the author. Contact information: mikic@un.org.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Preferential trade liberalization2 dominates current trade liberalization. While unilateral 
trade liberalization has occupied the pedestal of orthodox trade theory since Adam 
Smith,3 and while multilateral trade liberalization won the hearts of politicians in the 
second half of the twentieth century, preferential trade liberalization has been embraced 
by free trade pragmatists4 (who prefer to be called realists) from all stakeholder groups 
since 1990s.  
 
Derived from concessions (preferences) that existed in trade between colonies and the 
imperial powers (such as British Imperial Preferences), concessions today are extended 
through various channels with variable margins of preference to selected countries.5 
These comprise (a) eligible developing countries, for example, the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP); (b) the least developed countries, for example, Everything but Arms, 
(EBA); (c) countries fighting a war against drugs or terrorism; and (d) countries/members 
of the same trade agreements/areas. Consequently, most world trade today appears to be 
preferential trade of some type.6  
 
Countries that are non-receivers of preferences can interpret trade preferences given only 
to selected countries as trade discrimination. It is for this reason that the founders of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) installed the most favoured nation 
(MFN) system as the fundamental principle of the multilateral trading system. MFN 
assured that concessions given to any signatories of the then GATT had to be extended to 
other parties.7 Nevertheless, part of the original GATT rules (Part III) included articles on 
the formation of customs unions and free trade areas (GATT Article XXIV) exempting 
countries forming such agreements from having to apply the MFN clause. Later, during 
the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the Enabling Clause was adopted. It legalized partial 
trade preferences among developing countries and non-reciprocal partial preferences by 
developed to developing countries.8 MFN treatment could still be seen as having a 
                                                 
2 The term “preferential trade liberalization”, “preferential trade” and “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs) are used 
loosely to refer to a wide variety of agreements also classed as “regional trade agreements” (RTAs). It should be noted 
that members of RTAs are not always in geographical proximity. The term “regional integration” is used in this paper 
as a synonym for RTAs. 
3 While theory labels a unilateral path to liberalization as superior under certain conditions, not many governments 
choose to take it. See also Sally (2007). 
4 Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p.13) is one of many to have commented on the fact that: “PTAs came to be seen as a 
pragmatic, second-best approach to advancing liberalization at a time when the multilateral route seemed slow to 
deliver and unilateral liberalization was politically difficult.” See also Emmerson (2005) for a political science 
perspective.  
5 Non-trade concessions or non-economic benefits are not directly addressed in this paper. Throughout the paper, the 
words “country”, “nation” and “economy” are used as though they are synonymous.  
6 According to Grether and Olarreaga (1998), 42 per cent of world trade during 1993-1997 was preferential; the share 
was as high as 70 per cent for Western Europe, and as low as 4 per cent for Asia and Oceania. Crawford and Fiorentino 
(2005) estimated that preferential trade comprised 90 per cent of some countries’ trade. See also G.C. Hufbauer and Y. 
Wong (2005). D. Medvedev (2006) uses different approach in his calculation which does not support this claim. 
7 “(…) any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by such country to any product originating in any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to a like product originating in the territories of all other 
Members.” GATT Article I. 
8 See also Limão (2006) for a comparison of the Enabling Clause and GATT Art. XXIV on the requirements of 
preferences. It turns out that the Enabling Clause is more restrictive as it requires that preferences “shall not constitute 
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discriminatory impact since it allows less favourable treatment of non-members. As 
membership in the multilateral trading system has increased more than five-fold from that 
at its establishment in 1947, trade concessions under the MFN today should apply to all 
countries that feature in the world trade because some members also extend them 
(unilaterally and conditionally ) to selected non-members.9 The fact, however, is that the 
parallel rise in the number of free trade deals and other trade arrangements have, in 
effect, made MFN an exceptional treatment.10 Nonetheless, MFN treatment extended 
unconditionally to all members as envisaged by the GATT, remains a standard or 
benchmark for non-preferential and non-discriminatory trade.  
 
The Asian and Pacific region is no stranger to preferential trade. The Silk Road and trade 
in spices were developed with trade concessions. During the GATT era, however, 
preferences extended through trade agreements were not very evident in Asia and the 
Pacific. Following the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, readiness to liberalize trade through channels other than 
mainstream multilateral liberalization became much stronger. Thus, as a matter of choice, 
Asian and Pacific region countries embraced bilateral and other trade arrangements that 
very quickly produced a situation of entangled and overlapping preferential rules that 
have been informally named “Asian noodles”. This “Asian noodle bowl” situation closely 
mimics the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon associated with the trade relations between 
Europe and its trading partners.11  
  
Commentators suggest that instead of easing trade these preferential agreements tend to 
fragment markets and increase trade costs with adverse effects on trade volumes as well 
as global and national welfare.  The paper addresses this issue in the Asian and Pacific 
context. It identifies major characteristics of the agreements in force and contrast them 
with ‘best practice’ principles. Additional objective of the paper is to zero-in on treatment 
of agricultural trade in preferential agreements and compare them to achievements of  
multilateral liberalization.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section I identifies several stylized facts about the 
preferential trade in the Asia and the Pacific. Section II explores regional trade 
agreements with respect to their commitment to trade liberalization in goods and other 
standard areas of cooperation. Section III discusses preferential  liberalization in trade of 
agricultural goods. Section IV offers some ideas on “multilateralizing regionalism” 
including the ‘best practice’ agreement design and provides recommendations to 
policymakers in area of preferential trade negotiations. The special feature of the paper is 
that it relies mostly on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database 
(APTIAD) in sourcing data and information for analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
an impediment to the reduction of elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on a MFN basis”. Limão shows 
that the American and the European GSP schemes impede their multilateral liberalization under MFN.  
9 Cf. Deardorff and Stern (2005), p.6. 
10 The Sutherland Report (p. 19) (World Trade Organization, 2004) suggests that MFN could be “…defined as LFN 
(Least-Favoured Nation) treatment. 
11 The term “spaghetti bowl” is credited to Bhagwati (1992). It appears that Findlay and Pangestu (2001) introduced 
“noodles” to the RTA vocabulary. Cf. Mikic (2002). 
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Before continuing, it is necessary to discuss taxonomy of PTAs used in the paper. It is not 
only that preferential trade as phenomenon has become complex, it is that now it comes 
under many different names. As discussed above, the idea of a multilateral trading system 
was simple – concessions were to be shared on MFN basis by the members of club, and 
there were only few exceptions envisaged from this principle. At that time practice of 
preferential trade recognized free trade areas, customs unions and economic and political 
unions.12 Theoretical literature also followed this and a taxonomy was developed 
describing an extension of integration from shallow in free trade area, through 
intermediate in the customs union to deep in common market and economic/monetary 
union. The focus – reflecting also the spirit of GATT exceptions- was of course on deeper 
and regional (plurilateral) rather than bilateral agreements. 
 
Experience of countries in Asia and the Pacific results in a slightly different outcome.  
Figure I indicates that of the 87 agreements in force, 62 (71 per cent) are BTAs, and 12.6 
per cent comprises of each country-bloc agreements and RTAs.13 Of those BTAs, 77.5 
per cent are between two economies in the region and 22.5 of so-called cross-continental 
scope. There are 11 agreements (12.6 per cent) between a country and a bloc, and as 
many RTAs (11 or 12.6 per cent). Among country-bloc agreements, even six (55 per 
cent) are with ASEAN and three with EFTA (27 per cent).While RTAs are greatly 
outnumbered by the bilaterals, they do have relatively large membership (on average, 8.8 
economies). 14 Nine (82 per cent) comprise membership from ESCAP only, while two (18 
per cent) include non-ESCAP members.15 
  
Looking at the type of the agreements (which should matter to compliance with the 
multilateral trading rules), in both the bilateral and regional categories majority are free 
trade agreements (FTAs) and framework agreements. Among 62 BTAs there are 50 (or 
80 per cent) listed as FTA, and 7 (11.3 per cent) as framework agreements. The rest 
include preferential trading agreements (four, making 6 per cent) and one is a non-
reciprocal agreement. In contrast, 14 cross-continental BTAs include 8 (57 per cent) of 
FTAs, 4 (28.6 per cent) of FAs and 2 other agreements. In the category of country-bloc 
PTAs, structure is very different with more than half being framework agreements (55 
per cent), and rest made up of FTAs (36 per cent) and one customs union (EC-Turkey). 
The results for RTAs show a combination of the previous two class of agreements: there 
is one CU (EAEC) and four PTAs (within category ‘others’), four (36 per cent) of FTAs 
and two FAs (18 per cent).  
                                                 
12  Excluding so-called preferential clubs based on colonial trade concessions. 
13 Zhai (2006) comments that BTAs were preferred because of their lesser costs in terms of negotiation and 
enforcement efforts. While this might hold for every individual member of the BTA, the resulting costs for 
all BTAs might easily be higher compared with all RTAs. Bonapace (oral comm.) argues that this could be 
because of the lack of “peer pressure” as well as institutional framework often missing from the BTAs but 
built-in many of the RTAs. Feridhanusetyawan (2005) held that the faster increase in BTAs than in RTAs 
(plurilateral agreements) contributed to a complexity of the picture as many of those BTAs arose “within 
and across different regional agreements”.  
14 ASEAN FTA in Goods (AFTA) and in Services (AFAS) are counted as two RTAs; if only AFTA is 
counted, average membership is 9.7. 
15 Both are remnants of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
© ESCAP  SWP/TID/06/1 
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Figure I. Mapping of Asia-Pacific preferential trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: APTIAD, February 2007;  
Note: the number does not add to 87 as there are 3 other agreements not shown (1 global, and 2 country-plurilateral) 
R = intra-regional bilateral agreements 
XC = cross-continental bilateral agreements 
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I. STYLIZED FACTS  
  
There are four clear stylized facts about the Asian and Pacific approach to preferential 
trade arising from analysis of information in APTIAD: 
A. Fast growth in number of preferential trade agreements in recent years. 
B. Multiple and potentially conflicting trading rules.  
C. Multiple memberships. 
D. Weak evidence of trade creation and even less of trade diversion.  
 
We discuss and illustrate each one in turn.  
 
A. Proliferation of trade agreements 
 
The process of regional integration in earnest started in the 1990s, more precisely during 
and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (figure II). Only one trade agreement dates 
back to 1975: the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), formerly known as the 
‘Bangkok Agreement’. Other agreements predating the 1990s are Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA, 1983) and the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967); however, the latter grew more out of 
political rather than trade motivations.16 
 
 
Figure II. Asia and the Pacific – late bloomers in regionalism 
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16 Feridhanusetyawan, 2005 (p.14), stated that “ASEAN was established during the Cold War to maintain peace and 
security in the region, and the formation of AFTA in 1992 kept ASEAN relevant when the Cold War ended.”  
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This paper does not seek to explain in detail the proliferation of BTAs and RTAs in the 
region in the past decade. There were different factors at play. Some strongly believe that 
regionalism flourished because governments realized that BTAs and RTAs allowed for a 
faster, more tailored approach to specific country needs and were more flexible in terms 
of implementation time and inclusion of the behind-border measures. Another 
explanation refers to the political and strategic motivations, which enhanced intraregional 
cooperation during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Yet another factor associated with 
the spread of regionalism is the so-called “domino effect” that increases the incentive for 
countries to join existing agreements (the “follow the crowd” effect), which explains why 
so many governments will engage in the process of BTAs and RTAs negotiation. 
Bonapace and Mikic (2005 and 2007-forthcoming) addressed these and other factors 
driving the proliferation of PTAs in the region in the past decade. 
 
 
B. Multiple and potentially conflicting trading rules 
 
Fast multiplication of agreements shown in figure II resulted in an increasing density of 
the “noodle bowl” phenomenon associated with preferential trade. Figure IIIa illustrates 
this “noodle bowl” view of the preferential trade routes in this region. It shows the 
entanglement of bilateral and regional free trade and other types of agreements that are in 
force. There are about 40 more that are being negotiated, and many more that are 
considered in either political or policy circles (some analysts mention up to 200 
cooperative agreements at different process stages to be related to Asia and the Pacific 
economies). Figure IIIb illustrates both the trade agreements in force and those that are 
under negotiation – a simple visual test that shows how density will increase as these 
agreements become signed and implemented.  It is quite appropriate to describe this state 
of affairs as a “motley assortment” (Baldwin, 2006) working against trade creation rather 
than for it.  
 
Figure IIIa. The “noodle bowl” 
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Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007. 
 
 
Figure IIIb. Adding more tangles to the “noodle bowl” 
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Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, September 2006. 
 
 
C.  Multiple memberships 
 
The previous analysis discovers an important asymmetry. From 1994 to 2006, the number 
of all agreements in force expanded from 10 to 87, or a more than eightfold increase. Of 
the total 58 ESCAP regional members, the number of those involved in this proliferation 
of agreements increased from 41 to 50 during the same period, or 51 including the 
USA.17 Only one ESCAP-cum-WTO member remains unattached to any of the trading 
blocs. In contrast, most ESCAP members, who are not WTO members, are members of at 
least one and up to 11 PTAs. The average number of agreements per ESCAP member is 
5.6. This indicates multiple memberships and a significant overlap in the membership of 
agreements. 
 
Overlapping memberships arise from parallel BTAs and RTAs for the same set of 
economies One country ends up negotiating with another under several unrelated 
                                                 
17 Non-regional members are France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America. Their agreements are not covered in the analysis unless signed with one or more regional 
members, e.g. United States - Singapore FTA is included, while United States- Jordan FTA is not.  This leaves only 
three ESCAP members (Mongolia, Palau and Timor-Leste) and five ESCAP associate members (American Samoa, 
French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands) not involved in preferential trade at present. 
Only Mongolia is also a World Trade Organization member.  
BTA   RTA  Country –bloc  Under negotiation  
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framework agreements. As an example of this option, consider the case of India and Sri 
Lanka which have at least four trade-related agreements. The oldest is APTA (1975), by 
type a preferential agreement, currently among six members. Other regional agreements 
include BIMSTEC (1997) and SAARC (1985)/SAPTA18 (1995) and SAFTA19 (2006) 
agreements among the same members. In addition, India and Sri Lanka signed a bilateral 
FTA in 2001.  
 
A review of the agreements does not indicate that they have the same rules of origin, or 
the same approach to liberalization in trade of goods, services, customs procedures or 
dispute settlement (see Annex Table 1). Thus, even in this example of two countries, it is 
possible to infer how trade costs might be increasing because of the opaque rules 
covering trade between India and Sri Lanka. This is not to argue that trade cannot flourish 
in this environment. In fact, Sri Lankan exports to India increased fivefold from 2001 to 
2004. Imports in the same period only doubled. The issue, however, is that with multiple 
agreements one does not know which particular set of rules drives trade growth or which 
set might act as an obstacle. In the India-Sri Lanka case, while it is plausible to associate 
trade growth with the 2001 FTA, it is important to be able to identify any contribution by 
other agreements. The question should also be asked whether an even larger increase in 
trade could have been achieved with fewer agreements and, arguably, lesser costs. Lastly, 
one should not ignore the impact of unilateral liberalization processes in both countries. 
Sri Lanka started to simplify and lighten its protective regime in late 1970s, and by late 
1980s unilateral trade liberalization was reflected in sharp growth of Sri Lankan total 
imports. 
 
Multiple and overlapping membership is not isolated to these two countries; it is spread 
across the region. Only eight ESCAP members and associate members are not involved 
in PTAs process (Mongolia, Palau and Timor-Leste among the member and American 
Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands from the 
associate members list). It appears that signing and implementing between one and three 
agreements is either most beneficial, most popular or the easiest, as 21 countries 
implement from one to three agreements (seven in each category). Implementing more 
than three agreements is more demanding and the number of countries managing to do so 
decreases sharply as the number of agreements increases (see trend line in figure IV). The 
maximum number of agreements per single country is implemented by Singapore (19), 
followed by Thailand (14), India (13), Malaysia (12) and Turkey (12). The average 
number of agreements in force per country, not counting those countries without any 
agreements, is 5.6. The average number of all agreements per country, again excluding 
the eight without agreements, is 7. 
 
 
                                                 
18 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation/ SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement. 
19 South Asian Free Trade Area. 
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Figure IV. ESCAP economies in multiple PTA memberships, 
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While Singapore is implementing the largest number of agreements,20 it seems to be not 
overlapping their members. A small degree of overlap appears in the case of deals with 
India (the Singapore–India BTA and AFTA–India agreement) and with New Zealand 
(one BTA and one plurilateral). India, however, lead with respect to overlapping 
memberships.  This overlap occurs as shown with Sri Lanka but also in case of Thailand 
(BIMSTEC, AFTA-India and BTA). Furthermore, India has BTAs with almost all 
countries that are also members of SAPTA/SAFTA and BIMSTEC as well as with most 
members of APTA and some of AFTA. This is shown in figure V. The important 
question and not discussed in this paper is about economic and political reasons for a 
country to negotiate parallel and seemingly non-related agreements that include the same 
subset of members? 
 
Figure V. Leader in multiple memberships 
                                                 
20 Seven of these are bilaterals with various but mostly high-income economies (Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States) 
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Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, August 2006. 
 
 
 
 
D. Much ado about nothing – many agreements, little trade? 
 
The objectives of trade agreements, as set out in legal documents and texts of the 
agreements, include expanding trade, promoting investment, developing economic 
integration, establishing regional cooperation and coordination, promoting human rights 
and democracy, and improving security (cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005). Newer 
agreements in particular are trying hard to broaden coverage of commitments from 
liberalization of merchandise trade to behind the border provisions in trade and other 
areas of cooperation. In many instances, as mentioned above, members have broad 
concessional aspirations; to reflect them, the members increasingly name agreements as 
“economic partnerships” or “closer economic relations” rather than FTAs.   
 
Notwithstanding this intent to liberalize beyond trade in goods, in many cases it takes 
long transition /implementation periods for any real liberalization to take effect and to be 
reflected in the changed trade flows. It is not rare for the agreements to consist only of the 
agreement (often called a framework agreement) to start negotiation on cooperation or 
trade liberalization. Some anecdotal support exists for the claim that countries sometimes 
only intend to initiate regional cooperation without much commitment with regard to 
trade or even economic objectives. This practice introduces unnecessary trade 
discrimination to foster regional cooperation in areas that might not even require trade 
preferences, such as recognition of regulatory regimes, exchange of information and 
infrastructural provisions (cf. Schiff and Winters, 2003, p. 264). The cost of achieving 
such cooperation is then much higher than necessary (and sometimes even more than the 
benefits accrued through cooperation). Furthermore, it leads to “trade negotiation” fatigue 
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that sometimes tends to be cured by reducing efforts in multilateral trade negotiations, 
which are perceived as more difficult.  
 
This section provides some additional information on intra- and extra-regional trade 
flows and trade dependence to enable a better understanding of the potential impacts of 
preferential trade agreements. The expectation that members have is that PTAs will help 
boost mutual trade (of those products awarded (more) liberal trade treatment) over and 
above the growth of their total trade.  
 
Total trade of ESCAP members has increased in absolute terms and today accounts for 
almost 30 per cent of world exports and imports. The value of their intraregional trade 
increased (figure VI) dramatically from 1980 to 2005 also in absolute terms. Starting with 
slightly smaller value of intraregional trade than NAFTA in 1980, by 2005 the Asian and 
the Pacific region had surpassed NAFTA and had closed the gap with the EU15 
intraregional trade from 4/5 to 1/3. However, as a share in total world trade, this 
intraregional trade remained stagnant (table 1). 
 
 
Figure VI. Growth of intra-regional trade for selected regions 
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 Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE data 
 
 
Nevertheless, the growth in intraregional trade can be combined with an indicator of trade 
dependence to tell us more about “fortress building” attitude of trade agreements. As 
table 1 shows, total trade dependence,21 which is a contribution of total trade to the 
region’s collective gross domestic product, increased by coefficient 1.7 over this time. 
Similarly, an indicator showing only the contribution of extra-regional trade to the 
region’s gross domestic product grew by slightly less than the total trade dependence 
                                                 
21 This indicator is often interpreted as “trade openness”. See Bowen, Hollander and Viaene (1998, pp.12-15).  
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(coefficient of 1.64 over the same 10 years). Despite small difference, this points to an 
increase in the reliance on intraregional trade by ESCAP economies, giving support to a 
claim of “appearance of the third mega trading bloc” to join the European Union and 
NAFTA. Thus, intraregional trade is growing in both the absolute and relative sense. 
However, no fall in trade with the rest of the world makes it difficult to identify this trend 
of growing intraregional trade as trade diversion. Furthermore, a reliable measure of a 
link between the increase in intraregional trade and the existence of preferential trade, 
that is, BTAs and RTAs is still missing. Also, does trade growth among members of the 
agreements precedes or follows preferential agreements? These questions remain high on 
the list of future empirical research topics. 22 
 
 
Table 1. ESCAP trade performance basics 
Group 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006***
Total trade as a 
percentage of  world 
trade 
26.81 27.77 24.78 27.31 26.91 29.17 29.4 
Intraregional trade as a 
percentage of  word 
trade 
13.02 13.29 10.99 12.74 12.88 14.45 12.9 
Total trade dependence 27.39 33.05 35.34 39.36 39.69 46.46 .. 
Extraregional trade 
dependence 
14.07 17.24 19.27 20.32 19.99 23.28 .. 
Total number of 
BTAs* in force 6 17 22 26 30 46 73 
Total number of RTAs 
in force 
4 5 6 6 6 8 11 
Members with 
membership in GATT/ 
WTO  
20 22 24 25 26 27 28** 
Regional members  
and associate members 
involved in PTAs  
41 44 44 44 45 49 50 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD and WITS, August 2006. 
Note: * includes cross-continental BTAs; ** Viet Nam accession process finalized in 2006, but it formally 
acceded 30 days after completion of  internal ratification process, i.e. on 11 January 2007. Tonga’s accession 
process was finalized in 2005, but ratification is pending; *** GDP figures not available for 2005 and 2006, 
and trade figures refer to 2005 
 
Figure VII panel a shows total trade among the members of each one of the 10 RTAs in 
the region in 2005, and panel b shows those values for the years in which those RTAs 
were signed. In 2005 AFTA leads with almost USD300 billion worth of intra-bloc trade 
but members of APTA are not much behind. It is however not possible to assert how 
much of this trade in any of the blocs is done under the preferential terms negotiated (in 
that sense the bubbles present the maxima). Identification of the share of trade associated 
with the establishment of the preferential trade area is still one of the most tedious 
empirical trade research (cf. Mayda and Steinberg, 2007, DeRosa, 2007). 
 
                                                 
22 See Mayda and Steiberg (2007) for lack of evidence for an across-the-board new trade creation in 
response to Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and DeRosa (2007) for slightly different 
arguments. 
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Figure VII. Value of intra-bloc trade in 2005 
 
Panel a – Size of bubbles reflect values of intraregional trade in USD thousands in 2005 
 
 
APTA, 210050
CISFTA, 881857
EAEC, 5557034
ECOTA, 3814339
PICTA, 47959
SPARTECA, 5829697
AFTA, 69443725
SAFTA, 2450925
BIMSTEC, 5759489
 
Panel b – Size of bubbles reflect values of intraregional trade  in USD thousands in years when the RTAs 
were signed: AFTA 1992, APTA 1975, BIMSTEC 1997, CISFTA 1994, EAEC 1995, ECOTA 2003,  MSG 
1993, PICTA 2001, SAFTA 1993, SPARTECA 1981 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE and APTIAD 
 
APTA, 273846753
CISFTA, 114505144
EAEC, 55634821
ECOTA, 5995675 
MSG, 26049
PICTA, 59658
SPARTECA, 25880905 AFTA, 286418627
BIMSTEC, 18308978
SAFTA, 10606211
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In 2005, as table 2 shows, slightly less than 30 per cent of total ESCAP trade was 
associated with BTAs and RTAs; this amounted to less than 9 per cent of world trade.23 
While close to 60 per cent of PTA-linked intraregional trade was done my members of 
the BTAs, more than half of that was linked to BTAs that had one extra-regional member 
(e.g., the United States, EU/EFTA etc.). This might indicate that there was still a great 
deal of untapped potential for developing intraregional trade linkages among ESCAP 
members.  
 
 
Table 2. Trade of BTAs and RTAs in force, 2005a 
 Share in total ESCAP 
trade (%) 
Share in total world 
trade (%) 
BTAs (61 BTAs) 16.2 4.7 
- Regional (33 BTAs) 6.6 1.9 
- Other (28  BTAs) 9.6 2.8 
RTAs (11 RTAs) 13.2 3.9 
- Regional (6 RTAs) 10.2 3.0 
Total preferential trade 29.4 8.6 
Total ESCAP trade  29.2 
Memorandum items: 
- Total ESCAP trade (US$ billion) 
- Total world trade (US$ billion) 
 
5 077 
 
 
 
17 405 
Source: Computed using APTIAD and COMTRADE data, February 2007. 
a Where 2005 trade data are unavailable, the most recent available year is used. 
 
 
 
II.   LIBERALIZATION  PATTERNS 
 
 
There is a simple test for determining whether an agreement is efficient or “good” – it 
must create trade for the members of the agreement without diverting trade from the rest 
of the world (ROW).24 The literature over time has also identified the conditions under 
which the net trade creation would be more likely. The World Bank (2004) summarizes 
these as:25   
• Number and type of members. More members with dissimilar economies is 
preferable to fewer homogenous economies; 
• MFN tariffs faced by ROW. Lower MFN tariffs after the formation of 
agreement will minimize trade diversion; 
                                                 
23 Note that table 4 shows intra-ESCAP trade as 12.9 per cent of world trade. Intra-ESCAP trade is larger 
than the sum of trade of members of BTA and RTA in implementation (which makes 8.6 per cent of world 
trade). 
24 This is, of course, dramatic simplification. Trade creation and trade diversion should reflect changes in welfare that 
are sourced through replacement of inefficient with more efficient production among the partners (trade creation) and 
the opposite in relation to the ROW (trade diversion). As static measures of welfare changes, they do not reflect all 
efficiency changes that could be arising from RTAs. Needles to say, it is problematic to derive general conclusions 
based on partial equilibrium analysis.  Calculation of trade creation and trade diversion is complex and is not among the 
objectives of this paper.  
25 GATT Article XXIV stipulates some of these in form of “WTO compliancy”.  See in particular para 5 (a), (b), (c), 8 
(a) and  (b). Similarly GATS Article V para 4. 
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• Coverage in terms of measures, sectors and products. A negative list with as few 
exemptions as possible is preferred, and with reduction/elimination of all border 
trade barriers in a short period of time; 
• Rules of origin. Flexible, transparent and liberal allow for more trade creation; 
• Measures to facilitate trade. Inclusion of areas and measures beyond good trade 
will facilitate cross-border competition and permit more trade creation.26  
 
How do Asian-Pacific trade agreements measure against those conditions? We comment 
on them in turn, starting with summarizing conclusions of the already discussed first 
point .  
 
A. Membership 
 
As discussed in section I, most of the region’s large number of trade agreements in force 
are bilateral (precisely, 71 per cent). The largest share of those agreements pair together 
developing economies (or transition economies). Less then 30 per cent are between two 
“diverse economies”, e.g., developed and a developing economy. On the other hand, even 
though there is only a small share of RTAs in the region, on average they comprise about 
nine members; this would go some way towards meeting the criteria on large 
memberships.  
 
Taking into account the fact that around 40 agreements are being in the process of 
negotiation only in this region, and that most of them include one or more of the major 
trading economies of the region (or world), closure of those negotiations might bring 
global efficiency improvement in line with this condition on numbers and types of 
members. This improvement would arise because of the increasing number of countries 
able to generate trade creation would be leaving the “outsiders” camp and entering the 
camp of “regional partners” (thus reducing the potential for trade diversion, ceteris 
paribus). However, this extension of membership cannot happen automatically because 
typically existent agreements are designed as “closed clubs”. For example, most RTAs in 
the region remind closed for the current members or future members of the association 
underlying the trade agreement (ASEAN in case of AFTA, BIMSTEC in case of 
BIMSTEC FTA, ECO for ECOTA, SAARC for SAFTA and the South Pacific Forum for 
SPARTECA). Only two agreements allow for expansion through direct members in the 
trade agreement: APTA only to the developing members of ESCAP, and PICTA to any 
state or territory. Even with open access to membership, the efficiency-improving 
outcome would be more clear-cut in case of parallel consolidation of these agreements 
under harmonized enforcement rules. Additionally, it is necessary that the agreements 
satisfy other conditions, particularly the extent of liberalization. 
 
 
B. MFN tariff levels 
 
                                                 
26 Trade facilitation in the regional PTAs is a theme of a separate working paper and it is not discussed here (see 
IIBE&L, 2006). Competition policy and government procurement provisions in PTAs of ESCAP are also not discussed 
in this paper.  
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Table 3 demonstrates trends in unweighted average applied tariff rates in most of the 
countries in the region. It is true that most countries show declining average tariff rates. 
This is a result of combined working of the following forces: 
(a) Multilateral trade negotiation of the Uruguay Round and accession to WTO; 
(b) Preferential trade liberalization; 
(c) Unilateral trade liberalization efforts that many economies in the region have 
followed since the early 1990s.  
 
 
Table 3. Trends in average applied tariff rates, 1996-2005 (unweighted in %) 
Code 
 
Economy/group 
 
1996 
  
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002
 
2003 
 
2004
 
2005 
(est.) 
1 Bangladesh   26.7 26.7 21.3 21.2 19.3 19.9 18.8 16.4 16.8 
1 Bhutan 17.5 15.3 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 17.7   22.2 22.2 
1 Cambodia 35.0  18.0 18.0 17.0 16.5 16.1 16.0 15.6   
1 India 37.0 34.2   32.4 32.7 30.9 28.3   28.3 16.0 
1 Kyrgyz Republic     4.6 4.5 8.2 4.3    
1 Lao PDR 9.5   9.5 9.3 9.6     9.4 9.2 
1 Mongolia  5.0   4.9 6.9 6.8 4.9 4.9 4.2 
1 Myanmar 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.5 
1 Nepal 14.8 17.3 21.7 14.2 14.2 14.7 14.6 14.8 14.8 14.7 
1 Pakistan 41.7 46.6 45.6 24.1 23.6 20.2 17.2 16.8 16.2 14.3 
1 Papua New Guinea 20.7 20.4   20.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 6.1 6.1 5.7 
1 Solomon Islands ** 22.7 45.0 24.0 24.0 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.2    
1 Tajikistan **  8.3 5.0 5.0 8.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.0   
1 Uzbekistan 21.0 21.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 10.4 10.6      
1 Viet Nam  13.0 13.0 15.6 15.1 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.6 13.1 
2 Armenia   5.0 3.7 4.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6 
2 Azerbaijan   12.0 12.0 12.0 10.8 9.8 10.1   10.0 
2 China 22.0 16.7 16.6 16.3 16.2 15.2 12.3 10.5 9.6 9.0 
2 Fiji ** 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 8.3 8.8 7.9 
2 Georgia   10.0 10.0 9.9   9.7 9.8 7.6 7.4   
2 Indonesia 10.8    9.9 7.8 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.5 
2 Iran, Islamic Rep. of  28.0 30.0 30.0 37.4 30.0 27.3 18.9 17.7   
2 Kazakhstan ** 10.0 9.3 9.5 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9       
2 Malaysia 8.4 8.9   8.2 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.4  7.5 
2 Maldives 20.8  22.0 22.0 21.3 21.1 21.2 21.1 21.1 21.2 
2 Philippines 14.0 12.7 10.4 9.5 7.1 6.9 5.3 4.5 5.5 5.4 
2 Russian Federation 11.2 14.0 13.9 12.6 11.1 10.7 10.3    10.0 
2 Samoa **   18.0 18.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0     
2 Sri Lanka  19.6 11.1 10.9 9.3 8.9 8.9 8.7 9.9 10.8 
2 Thailand     16.9 16.4 14.4   13.5   9.9 
2 Turkey 7.0 6.7   7.2 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.7   2.5 
2 Turkmenistan  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 5.4 5.3     
2 Vanuatu   29.0 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 17.0 13.8     
3 Brunei Darussalam 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.1 
3 Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 Macao, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 Singapore 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 Australia 6.8 6.6 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 4.2 
4 European Union  3.0 2.4 2.9 3.6 2.2 3.1 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.5 
4 Japan 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 
4 Korea, Rep. of 9.7 9.2 9.7 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.6 
4 New Zealand 6.3 6.0 4.7 3.9 3.0 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 
4 United States 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.1 3.0 
  Memo: average             
1 to 
2 
Developing countries 
(142) 17.9 17.7 16.5 14.8 13.7 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.9 10.2 
1 Low income (56) 22.4 21.5 20.3 17.9 15.3 13.7 14.0 11.9 13.3 12.1 
2 Middle income (86) 13.0 14.3 13.9 12.5 12.3 11.3 10.6 9.6 10.0 8.7 
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   3 
High income non-
OECD (14) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 
   4 
High income OECD 
(10) 5.5 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.1 
                        
Source: extracted from Francis K.T. Ng, 2006, Data on Trade and Import Barriers, World Bank 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/tar2005.xls) 
Notes: All tariff rates are based on unweighted averages for all goods in ad valorem rates, or applied rates, or MFN rates 
whichever data is available in a longer period. Tariff data is primarily based on UNCTAD TRAINS database and then used 
WTO IDB data for gap filling if possible. Data in 1980s is taken from other sources. 
** Tariff data in these countries came from IMF Global Monitoring Tariff file in 2004, which might include other duties or 
charges. 
Country codes are based on the classifications by income in WDI 2006, where 1 = low income, 2 = middle income, 3 = high 
income non-OECD countries, and 4 = high income OECD countries. 
 
 
With respect to MFN tariffs faced by ROW after the conclusion of the agreements, it is 
difficult to acquire exact and reliable data. The fact that among the regional RTAs there is 
only one partially functioning customs union (EAEC) means there is no real threat from 
creating high common external tariffs. Figure VIII shows the level of average applied 
tariffs of 10 RTAs (AFAS not included) calculated from table 3  for 2005 or in the most 
recent year when 2005 was not available (Annex figure 1 shows individual countries in 
each of the 10 RTAs). This average ranges from 7.5 per cent for AFTA to 16.6 per cent 
for SAFTA. SAFTA is also the only RTA in which all individual members’ averages 
stand at above 10 per cent, while in AFTA only Cambodia and Viet Nam have over 10 
per cent average applied tariff.  APTA on average has slightly higher protection than the 
RTAs taken together mostly because relatively high averages of Bangladesh and India.  
 
Figure VIII Simple average of applied unweighted tariffs of individual countries 
grouped in the RTAs (2005) 
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Source:  Calculated by the author from data in Table 6. 
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C. Approaches to reduction of tariffs in PTAs 
 
How important is the contribution of preferential trade liberalization to opening of a 
country? As noted above, declarative aspirations of all agreements are to transform trade 
among partners into duty-free trade. In many agreements, in fact, this is expressed as an 
ultimate goal; however, partners are taking many different routes to achieve this end. 
Table 4 summarizes the difference in approaches to tariff reduction in the enforced 
agreements that provide this information. A positive list approach is considered, in 
principle, less liberalizing and it consists of members agreeing to the list of products on 
the (positive) list whose tariffs will be reduced or eliminated. A negative list approach 
assumes a reduction/elimination of tariffs on all products except on those that are 
included in the negative list. This approach is closer to the spirit of GATT, even though it 
may often include a long list of excluded products. Another important factor is the 
determination of a base tariff rate as a benchmark for reduction. In most cases, the MFN-
applied rates are used for this purpose (cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005, p.16). In an effort to 
comply with the WTO rules on regional agreements, most of them contain an intention to 
eliminate tariffs within what is considered a reasonable period. When an LDC is 
involved, it is provided with either longer transition periods (e.g., AFTA) or lesser or no 
reduction commitments (e.g., APTA). Another interesting feature, and supporting 
previous claims about “made-to-measure” agreements, refers to asymmetrical reciprocity 
in tariff reduction even when there is no LDC involved. Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p.17) 
describes how, in the Singapore-United States FTA, which follows “negative list 
approach” the United States kept tariffs on about 8 per cent of  products over the 
transition period of eight years, while Singapore eliminated all tariffs immediately, 
binding them to zero. In the Singapore-Japan FTA, which follows a positive list 
approach, Singapore again reduced all tariffs to zero immediately while Japan committed 
to eliminating its tariffs gradually over a 10-year period.  
 
Table 4. Tariff reduction approaches in PTAs in ESCAP 
 
PTAs Positive list Negative list 
All  in force with information available 31 33 
 
BTA 22 25 
Cross-continental plurilateral 0 1 
Country-bloc 3 2 
RTA 5 5 
Global 1 0 
 
FTA 20 29 
Framework agreement 4 1 
Preferential trading arrangement 6 2 
CU 0 1 
Non-reciprocal arrangement 1 0 
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007. 
  
 
D.  Rules of origin 
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The current proliferation of agreements has spun a complex rules-of-origin web (table 5). 
Not only does each agreement have its own rules of origin; in addition, a bewildering 
array of product-specific rules of origin is emerging. Adopting the less restrictive rules of 
origin could result in significant trade deflection and redundancy of a trade agreement, 
while adopting the most restrictive rules of origin may result in no trade taking place 
under the agreement. Several chances have been missed, at both the WTO and regional 
levels, to bring some uniformity to the formulation of preferential rules of origin. GATT 
Article XXIV, quite remarkably, is silent on the use of preferential rules of origin. Should 
rules of origin not be viewed as other regulations of commerce that should not raise 
barriers to third countries any higher than they were prior to the formation of the PTA? 
The most that is said is embodied in a non-binding common declaration on principles.  
 
This increases the urgency of establishing an overarching, region-wide, common 
framework of principles, guidelines and procedures to which BTAs and RTAs would be 
anchored. Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, the point of departure should be the 
WTO common declaration. Ongoing work, notably in APEC, and other useful trade and 
development elements found in other agreements should be built on. For example, APTA 
recently agreed to common rules of origin (representing a wide spectrum of industrial 
development among the members) that are relatively simple, general and liberal – i.e., a 
flat rate of a minimum 45 per cent of local value content (35 per cent for least developed 
countries) in bilateral rules of origin, and at least 60 per cent (50 per cent for least 
developed countries) of regional content with full cumulation (cf. Baldwin, 2006).  
 
 
Table 5. Rules of origin provisions in selected trade agreements 
 
Source: Compiled from table 2 in Bonapace and Mikic, 2006, and APTIAD. 
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Consolidation of multiple membership agreements around more liberal rules of origin 
will serve as a tool for diminishing noodle bowl-related costs of trading under preferential 
regimes. One such example is provided with recent consolidation of bilateral trade 
agreements among the Southern European countries and a replacement by the common 
rules as part of an amended CEFTA deal. The new Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) consolidates 32 bilateral free trade agreements into a single regional 
trade agreement. The free trade area shall be established in a transitional period ending at 
the latest on 31 December 2010. New consolidated agreement replaces the network (aka 
spaghetti bowl) of bilateral free trade agreements to improve conditions to promote trade 
and investment by means of fair, clear, stable and predictable rules. The agreement 
consolidates and modernizes the region’s “rule book” on trade and includes modern trade 
provisions on issues such as competition, government procurement and protection of 
intellectual property. It facilitates convergence of relevant trade-related rules, notably 
with regard to industrial and sanitary-phytosanitary rules. A simplified single system of 
rules of origin (and other rules) makes it easier to trade within the region. Increased trade 
is necessary to promote growth, job creation and reduced youth unemployment. It is 
foundation for stability and peace. Such harmonization and simplification of rules of 
origin in the subregions of Asia could contribute to deepening of integration, as they are 
associated with increase in “seamless production”. 
 
E.  Going beyond the goods trade27 
 
Many of the newer initiatives declare intention to go well beyond reduction/elimination 
of tariffs and NTBs, including anti-dumping and safeguards, harmonization of 
competition policies and standards, and customs; however, a large number still just 
remain a collection of aspirations towards liberalization that tend to be associated with a 
longer negotiations process. In addition, despite these intentions to go deeper than trade 
integration, there is only an occasional mention of the formation of a CU or a common 
market in the Asian-Pacific region.28 Furthermore, while in the context of multilateral 
liberalization a number of countries strongly argue for more freedom in movements of 
labour (referring to Mode 4 liberalization), when it comes to BTAs and RTAs only few 
cover this area. A comparison of BTAs/RTAs of this region to existing deals in the 
Americas also illustrates a type of reluctance to negotiate all-inclusive comprehensive 
agreements. Instead, trade agreements are often accompanied by separate agreements on 
services, investments, intellectual property protection, customs procedures etc. Most of 
the new agreements cover trade in services (but pre-General Agreement on Trade in 
Services [GATS] agreements still have separate agreements on trade in services, such as 
the ASEAN FAS).  
Most of the newer agreements could be described as WTO-plus agreements as they 
extend concessionary coverage beyond multilaterally agreed disciplines – such as 
                                                 
27 Some of the agreements do not have legal texts publicly available in English or at all and therefore might not have 
been captured properly in counting the sectors covered.  
28 Such as the already cited “single economic market” of Australia and New Zealand. In the zenith of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, there were also calls for the establishment of a currency union. They were later merged into proposals 
for an East Asian Community. 
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government procurement, competition policy and the environment. This is true for trade 
agreements between developed economies and between developed and developing 
economies (Lesher and Miroudot, 2006). It is important to note that most agreements 
mention a number of WTOplus sectors when describing objectives of the agreement 
(typically in the preamble of the agreement text). However, a significant number of 
agreements only include a statement of intention to negotiate liberalization in certain 
areas. These agreements have been excluded from the scope of this study because they do 
not count for “substantive commitments”.  
 
The overview that is provided in figure IX only shows whether a concessionary 
commitment has been made in particular sectors or not. In order to provide a better 
assessment of the beyond-the-goods commitments, a more detailed analysis of the legal 
texts of the agreements is required. The most frequently covered area are investments 
provisions followed by IPRs and trade facilitation. Other areas which also get some 
coverage are government procurement, competition policies and labour mobility. 
Services are covered only in 24 agreements, including separate agreements for some 
parties. Table 6 provides a summary of treatments of four sectors (investment, IPR, 
labour mobility and services) with a view of differentiating between BTAs and other 
agreements in terms of  these sectors’ coverage.  
 
 
Figure IX. Overview of sectoral coverage by the PTAs  
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Table 6. Summary of treatments of selected sectors in the preferential trade 
agreements in Asia and the Pacific 
Intellectual property protection 
Type of agreement  Total 
FTA FA CU Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 19* 16 (7) 1 - 2 17 (7) 
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Country-bloc 6** 3 (1) 2 (1) - 5 (3) 
RTA 2 1 - - 1 2 
Other 1 1 - - - - 
Total 28(9) 21 (8) 3 (1) 3 24(10) 
Investment 
Type of agreement  Total 
FTA FA CU Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 23+ 17 (4) 5 - 1 17 (4) 
Country-bloc 6 2 4 - - 3 
RTA 3 2 1 - - 1 
Other 1 - 1 - - - 
Total 33* (4) 21 (4) 11 - 1 21 (4) 
Mobility of labour 
Type of agreement  Total 
FTA FA CU Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 8 7 1 - - 7 
Country-bloc 1 - 1 - - - 
RTA 2 1 1 - - - 
Other 1 1 - - - - 
Total 12 9 3 - - 7 
Services 
Type of agreement  Total 
FTA FA CU Other 
Notified to 
WTO 
BTA 18 17  1 - - 14 
Country-bloc 3 2 1 - - 3 
RTA 2 - 2 - - - 
Other 1 1 - - - - 
Total 24 20 4 - - 17 
Source: APTIAD and Annex tables 2-5 in Mikic (2007) 
( ) = Number of agreements involving Turkey. 
* Includes seven BTAs between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Israel, 
Romania and Tunis. 
** Includes one agreement between Turkey and EFTA , and one between Turkey and the European Union. 
+ Includes four BTAs between Turkey and Bulgaria, FYROM, Romania and Tunis. 
 
In terms of scope of agreement, it is obvious that the ‘beyond-the-goods’ sectors get 
captured by agreements that are bilateral, i.e. between two countries and between an 
established bloc and a country. It is mostly the FTAs that venture beyond the goods 
liberalization, except in investment where FAs feature too. It also appears that BTA-FTA 
get notified to the WTO faster than other agreements, contributing towards transparency 
of trading rules at global level.29   
 
III. PREFERENTIAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURE  
 
With regard to the coverage of goods liberalization, available empirical literature 
shows that most of the agreements focus on reducing or eliminating tariffs and other 
barriers to industrial goods or manufactures. In contrast, agricultural products tend to be 
included in the exemptions of the negative lists or excluded from the positive lists of 
tariff reductions.30  
                                                 
29 For some comments on content of provisions on these sectors, see Mikic (2007). 
30 The ARTNeT study undertaken in 2005 and 2006 (forthcoming), “Agricultural trade: Planting the seeds of regional 
liberalization in Asia”, reflects this selectivity and relatively weak liberalization in both the South Asian and the South-
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The five reasons why agriculture does not feature prominently on the agenda for 
full and/or quick liberalization through PTAs are that: 
 
(a) Agriculture was excluded from the multilateral trade liberalization efforts until 
the Uruguay Round, leaving the space for protectionist policies in this sector, 
which is one of the most supported sectors in many developed economies. 
This combination of policies earned the sector the attribute of being the “most 
distorted” in the world economy. Obviously, the removal of trade barriers and 
domestic support in such circumstances is not a simple matter. The task is 
complicated equally by the influence of vested interests, and a need for a 
coherent set of policy measures and financial resources to provide corrective 
support during the adjustment period, which could extend over a decade; 
 
(b) Agriculture produces food that is considered indispensable to human life, thus 
giving rise to concern over food safety and security. These issues are easier to 
include in multilateral negotiations with more players (and coalitions) and 
more possibilities for quid pro quo than in similar negotiations with fewer 
members, particularly when the negotiations are among those with similar 
interests in this area; 
 
(c) Agriculture appears to offer more fertile ground than other sectors for 
quantitative and export barriers as well as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
barriers and standard IPRs (that is, geographic indicators). Historical evidence 
shows that these issues are easier to deal with at the global or multilateral 
level than at the regional level; 
 
(d) Continuous support and protection of agriculture in developed economies has 
been justified by the so-called “multifunctionality” argument of agriculture. 
The sector is also often linked to environmental quality. It is easy to see that 
when two countries with same “defensive” approach in relation to 
multifunctionality negotiate a bilateral agreement, the scope for liberalization 
in agriculture will remain narrower than in negotiations at the multilateral 
level among countries with diverse interests in this area; 
 
(e) Last, but far from least relevant, in many developing countries, agriculture is 
still a very important, if not the most important sector of the economy in 
fighting poverty. In many developing countries, agriculture provides 
opportunities for people to grow their own food and to exchange surpluses in 
informal transactions without being registered as part of an official economy 
(e.g., in employment or tax revenue records). For example, while agriculture 
provided paid employment in India to only 5 per cent of the labour force 
during 2004, its rural population forms the largest part of the total population. 
This means the sector is instrumental in ensuring rural development and 
provision of livelihood security. When it comes to the negotiation of 
preferential liberalization, which often embraces “made to measure” 
liberalization, this sector (is more likely than others) to be granted longer 
                                                                                                                                                 
East Asian PTAs explored. See also Pasadilla, 2006, and Samaratunga and others 2006. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2005, reports similar findings. 
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transitional periods, lesser tariff cuts and other exemptions in order for it to 
become a vehicle for rural development. 
 
In developing this last point further, it would appear that preferential trade 
liberalization is more in line with the objectives of strategic intervention in agricultural 
trade than is multilateral liberalization. As argued in Dhar (2007) and literature cited 
therein, concern over food security, livelihoods and rural development in developing 
countries can be responded to by adopting the twin instruments of Special Products (SP) 
and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) as a variant of a strategic agricultural trade 
policy. The goal of this policy is primarily to secure food and safeguard livelihoods rather 
than create trade. Judging by the difficulties surrounding multilateral negotiations on 
these points as well as the comparatively easier introduction of SP and SSM into 
preferential trade agreements (cf. OECD, 2005, pp.16–17), PTAs ought to be ranked 
superior to multilateral liberalization in delivering this particular goal. However, further 
empirical research is desirable in order to shed more light on the welfare-improving 
effects of this particular strategic approach. 
 
A. Market access 
 
Annex table 2 contains information on average applied and bound tariffs for 
manufactures and agriculture goods for a selection of ESCAP member countries and for 
some other country groupings in recent years. These rates are the result of the combined 
impact of the multilateral negotiations under the Uruguay Round and national unilateral 
liberalization efforts. Only a handful of countries have average applied tariffs on 
agriculture goods that are lower than rates on manufactures (notably Australia, Hong 
Kong, China, Macao, China, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Pakistan and Singapore).  
Even fewer of them bind agriculture goods tariffs at a lower level than manufactures 
(Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, China, Islamic Republic of Iran, Macao 
China, Malaysia and New Zealand). More often, countries that show little reluctance 
towards reducing manufactures tariffs do not follow suit with tariffs on agricultural goods 
(Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and Turkey, among others). Obviously, tariff 
protection remains an obstacle in agricultural trade. 
 
Are PTAs more successful in reducing or eliminating these tariffs? In reviewing 
18 PTAs, including six from this region, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2005) found that PTAs offered some “progress even in traditionally 
difficult sectors such as beef, cotton, dairy, rice and sugar”, albeit with long transition 
periods.  
 
The ARTNeT study (forthcoming in 2007), which focuses on selected South 
Asian and South-East Asian PTAs, puts forward a similar finding that liberalization 
achieved in agriculture is lagging behind industrial goods liberalization. In fact, 
Samaratunga and others (2006) found that South Asia remained the most protective 
region with regard to agricultural trade. The most advanced RTA in that subregion, 
SAPTA (replaced by SAFTA in 2006) provided tariff concessions on 866 agricultural 
products; however; according to the authors, it is unlikely to boost agricultural trade 
because it neither removes NTBs nor uses simple rules of origin. A network of BTAs that 
evolved between India or Pakistan and other countries in the subregion in principle 
excludes “many of the major agricultural products in which the countries had [a] 
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comparative advantage, such as rice, wheat, sugar, cashew nuts, shrimps and prawns, 
while imposing tariff-rate quotas on many others, such as black tea and cotton”. A 
summary of the findings on tariffs and other areas of liberalization for the South Asian 
PTAs is given in annex table 3. 
 
In contrast, South-East Asia has a better record in agricultural trade liberalization, 
at least based on the achievements of AFTA and the ASEAN plus China Early Harvest 
programme (EHP). According to Pasadilla (2006), the average agriculture MFN tariff for 
AFTA members is higher than the CEPT mean with 95 per cent of CEPT tariff lines 
being below 5 per cent, and half of which are already traded tariff-free. It remains true, 
however, that more industrial goods are traded duty-free and almost 100 per cent of 
industrial tariffs are less than 5 per cent. Annex table 4 provides a summary of the 
provisions covering the agricultural sector in selected agreements in South-East Asia.  
 
B. Other aspects of agricultural trade liberalization 
 
The Uruguay Round approach to liberalization of trade in agriculture was aimed 
at three sources of distortions: market access barriers (tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions), export subsidies and domestic support. This turned out to be a difficult 
combination for the current multilateral negotiations as illustrated by the stop-go cycles 
linked to the various proposals on the agricultural segment of negotiations.  
 
Preferential trade agreements have “solved” the problem by not attempting to 
combine all three pillars of agricultural trade liberalization; PTAs rarely go beyond the 
market access aspect. This is true for PTAs both in this region and globally unless they 
are linked to “deeper” integration such as the European Union. Because it is such a 
sensitive area of liberalization, agriculture appears to require institutional frameworks of 
deeper integration.  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that none of the PTAs analysed in the two 
subregions (see annex tables 3 and 4) handles aspects of domestic support or export 
subsidies (except ANZCERTA, which does not permit domestic support or exports 
subsidies, and New Zealand–Singapore and Australia–United States, which do not permit 
export subsidies).  
 
As with other more narrow areas of trade disciplines, it would seem that PTAs 
have an advantage over the multilateral system. This would particularly apply in cases 
where harmonization and mutual recognition of national policies and practices is 
required, as this is achieved more easily among a smaller number of countries (with 
similar interests). The evidence gleaned from observed PTAs in the above-mentioned 
studies goes some way to supporting this claim as a number of agreements — particularly 
in South-East Asia and when one or more parties are developed economies — contain 
provisions related to SPS and technical cooperation such as harmonization, equivalence 
and mutual recognition. 
 
The above-mentioned ARTNeT study discusses the developmental impacts of 
improvements in the level and structure of intraregional agricultural protection. It cannot 
be denied that there are obvious advantages for a community and individuals when 
production and trade is enriched by processing raw agricultural materials into semi-
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finished and finished items such as processed food. The importance of workable rules of 
origin, traceability, technical standards and SPS for developing this processing capability 
in the region cannot be overstressed. Yet, countries, including developing nations, 
continue to adopt complicated rules of origin and other rules that prevent the 
establishment of regional production chains. This means countries that take a long time to 
develop an efficient, complete chain within the national economy will be unable to 
benefit from cumulation across the region as a shortcut to achieving that goal. 
 
 
IV. MAKING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC TO WORK IN LINE WITH MULTILATRAL TRADING RULES31  
 
A. ‘Best practice’ principles 
 
‘Best practice’ principles are increasingly used in analytical work. This task is by no 
means straightforward. The term best practices is fraught with value connotations. Even 
the legally binding and internationally adopted GATT Article XXIV is known to be 
“creaky” and “extremely elastic”. At worst it has been described as  “full of ambiguities”, 
“a contradiction” and “a failure, if not a fiasco”. Perhaps that is why it was often 
disregarded, if not in letter, then in spirit by the members. Yet it constitutes the best 
available approximation of how a “good” or “best practice” preferential trade agreement, 
should be designed so that they can be complimentary in their impacts to the multilateral 
trading system.  
 
Following on the analysis above, table 9 summarizes basic information on the approach 
each agreement takes with regard to tariff liberalization, sectoral coverage and treatment 
of WTO and WTO+ issues. In addition to policy-content recommendations from the 
GATT Article XXIV, we also draw on principles emanating from trade theory and 
econometric models as well as empirical findings to come with the set of ‘best practice’ 
principles (second column of the table). The third column contains information compiled 
for “real world” agreements (as already explained, the information was compiled for only 
those agreements for which a legal text was available in an updated and electronic format 
in English). A comparison between the two columns not only shows what types of 
preferential trade agreements are emerging in Asia and Pacific, but more specifically 
highlights the gap between reality and ‘good practice’ or model agreements. While most 
agreements aspire towards an eventual “free” trade area (typically 10-15 years down the 
road), increasingly, countries are settling for framework agreements that are lacking in 
operational details. Typically, and more so for agreements between developing countries, 
they are short on modalities of implementation, lack agreement on rules of origin, with 
little known on what recourse is available in the case of disputes arising from non-
compliance. These agreements thus appear to be signaling that free trade and trade 
integration is perhaps not the core issue at stake. Governments may be using the format to 
put together a framework of cooperation in several (non-trade-related) areas that often 
have strategic political and foreign policy objectives as the driving forces.  Consequently, 
the general reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization in merchandise trade is 
tempered by the willingness to expose other sectors and policies (notably WTO-plus) to 
preferential liberalization and regulatory reforms.  
                                                 
31 Part of this section was prepared by T. Bonapace and M. Mikic as a background paper for the ESCAP 
Survey 2007 (forthcoming). 
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Table 9. Comparisons of the “best practice” and actual trade agreements in Asia 
and the Pacific  
Area Aspiring state of 
affairs (best 
practice) 
Current state of 
affairs (actual 
agreements) 
Number of PTAs 
included in 
evaluation 
Liberalization in 
goods trade- listings 
and coverage 
Full liberalization 
taking place at 
enforcement of the 
agreement or with 
short transition period 
based on negative 
listing and covering 
both tariffs and NTBs 
Liberalization based 
on positive more than 
on negative listing; 
full liberalization over 
longer transition of 10 
years  
*24 BTAs and RTAs 
with positive listings 
* 6 BTAs and  RTAs 
with negative listings 
*22 BTAs and RTAs 
with  liberalization 
implemented on either 
positive or negative 
listing  (incl. 12  with 
“full” elimination) 
Rules of origin Simple and 
transparent in style; 
low and symmetrical 
in terms of demand; 
consistent across all 
agreements 
Bilateral cumulation,  
some diagonal 
cumulation;  
Product-specific ROO 
 
 
*15 BTAs 
*3 RTAs 
Comprehensive 
coverage of the “other 
than goods” sectors 
Comprehensive scope 
accounting for all 
sectors with 
exclusions necessary 
only for appropriately 
designed policy space 
Only smaller share 
(rarely more than 1/3) 
of agreements include 
preferential 
commitments in the 
“other than goods” 
areas; coverage is 
variable and far from 
comprehensive  
See Figure XXII for 
breakdown of 
agreements covering 
“other than goods” 
areas 
Consultations and 
Dispute settlement 
Avoid duplication 
with the WTO dispute 
settlement  whenever 
possible 
Only 1/3 of 
agreements cover DS 
and mainly through 
reliance on 
consultations 
*32 PTAs 
*17 BTAs and 4 
RTAs cover this area 
in more details 
Consistency and 
compliance with the 
WTO 
Notification to the 
WTO and  regular 
update of non-
members; open for 
accession of third 
parties 
About 1/3 of the 
BTAs and RTAs are 
not notified to the 
WTO 
*20 BTAs and 4 
RTAs are not notified 
Transparency Making full text 
available to all 
partners in English 
and electronically 
Some countries do not 
publish (original 
and/or updated) 
electronic versions of 
the legal texts of the 
agreements in English 
on the Internet   
About 10-15% per 
cent of the agreements 
lack updated 
information  
Source: compiled by the author from the APTIAD, November 2006 and Goode (2005) 
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B. Some questions answers to which should matter to policymakers 
 
Since there is no doubt that preferential trade will remain one of preferred trade policy 
options, there is a need to turn towards designing them in a way to work complimentary 
to multilateral trading system. There in no harm of repeating that this in the first place 
implies maximization of benefits from PTAs (trade creation) and minimization of their 
costs (trade diversion). Furthermore, whenever possible PTAs should be aiming for 
WTO+ level of integration thus going beyond the expected level of multilateral 
liberalization, not coming short of it. Without ambitions to provide “how to” manual for 
trade negotiators32, this section outlines the four areas of issues most relevant in 
negotiating preferential trade liberalization agreements: why (including with whom and 
for whom), what, how and at what cost.  
 
i. Why preferential trade, with whom and for whom?  
 
Preferential trade agreements may offer “some appropriate solutions to national policy 
needs, they may confer credibility on policy regimes, help to solve political problems or 
increase competition” (Schiff and Winters, 2003, p.261). There are, however, many other 
situations where trade agreements unnecessarily increase the economic price payable for 
non-economic (and uncertain) gains and/or increase the costs of an inappropriately 
chosen trade liberalization path.  Therefore, even before approaching the agreement 
design and negotiation phase, a difficult policy choice facing policymakers is whether to 
enter into negotiations and if yes, with whom. The following, represents a non-exclusive, 
list of questions that need to be posed and answered prior to entering into negotiations: 
1) Why is the proposed trade agreement with a particular trading partner(s) 
important to the economy, i.e. is it mostly motivated by 
a. Needs to enhance goods trade  
b. Needs to enhance services trade and /or foreign direct investment  
c. Needs to ensure support for overall economic reform (as a stability 
anchor) 
d. Needs to enhance political and security cooperation. 
2) Is it not possible to obtain the same results through other liberalization tracks 
(unilateral, multilateral)? 
3) Are there any sectors and social strata in the economy which might be particularly 
adversely affected by the agreements and what are the planned measures to ease 
those effects? Will this require excluding such sector(s) from the agreement?  
4) Which are the sectors that will benefit? Are direct transfers between winners and 
losers possible so to ensure a more equitable distribution of the gains from trade? 
5) Are the likely post-facto production structure, employment, revenue and other 
socio-economic welfare effects in consonance with the objectives of a long term 
development plan for the economy? 
 
Obviously the above and similar questions can be answered only if proper analysis of the 
agreement’s potential effects has been undertaken. A first step in the preparation of any 
changes in economic and social policy must therefore be a rigorous analytical 
preparation, including securing sound and reliable statistics and other (soft) data. 
                                                 
32 See for example “Negotiating Skills Manual – Market Access in an Economic Partnership Agreement”, 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex or Goode (2005).  
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APTIAD’s extension in performance indicators is potentially helpful tool in such 
analysis. 
 
 
ii. What design? 
 
Design of the agreement should be modeled on the above discussed ‘best practice” or 
model designs. The arguments for the above list are contained in a long list of literature 
on preferential trade liberalization published over 50 years, including the most recent 
ones like Baldwin (2006), Limão (2006), Plummer (2006) and Zhai (2006). They all 
(from different approaches and using different techniques of analysis) tend to support the 
finding that preferential trade “as is now” probably impedes multilateral liberalization 
and has ambiguous welfare effects on participating and non-participating members. 
However, with a corrective action preferential trade can be made complimentary to the 
multilateral system and their implementation can contribute to development. These 
actions should include, inter alia: 
- minimizing positive listing approach as “limited number of sectors and 
sequencing issues could lead to important adverse effects on effective protection 
and other indirect efficient effects (Plummer, 2006, p.3) 
- maximizing the diagonal cumulation in rules of origin which will allow 
defragmentation of production and multilateralization of regionalism (Baldwin, 
2006), 
- deepening the regional integration to allow for more positive effect for freeing 
global trade (Zhai, 2006). 
 
 
iii. How? 
 
In terms of the negotiation process, policymakers should be prepared to stay the course 
on the long haul. Besides the need for long term planning, this requires the setting up an 
administrative, legal and judicial institutional structure with the requisite human resource 
expertise. However, the best policy-making is perhaps that one which is based on a full 
understanding of the domestic economy, and the transmission mechanisms through which 
changes in trade policy work their way through the economy. A quantitative estimation of 
the effects of possible liberalization scenarios, if based on sound theoretical constructions 
of models can play a useful role. It is important for trade negotiators and policy makers to 
factor into their decision-making that gains from liberalization come from opening of a 
domestic market as much as (if not more) from opening foreign markets. It is  however 
crucial to understand that a) gains and costs of liberalization have asymmetrical time 
dimensions, with costs typically appearing much sooner than the gains; and b) effects of a 
policy change cannot be contained to a sector to which they originally apply but do have 
impacts on the rest of the economy. Negotiations will be successful if an agreement is 
implementable with net gains for the economy and this can be achieved only if before, 
during and after negotiations, policymakers maintain full consultation and information 
sharing with the stakeholders.33  
                                                 
33 More research is also needed on the best practices in inclusive decision-making in regard to negotiation 
PTAs. Some governments invite public to voice their concerns and interest in a preparatory phase of 
negotiations. See for example a call for public views on the New Zealand- GCC trade negotiations to start 
later in 2007 at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Business-gateway/0-NZ-GulfCo-
opCouncilFTA-Publicview.php. 
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iv. At what cost? 
 
Finally costs cannot be ignored. Proliferation of agreements is expensive. Costs are direct 
and indirect (or opportunity costs). Direct costs arise from a need to adequately finance 
negotiating machinery which – depending on country’s ambitions – could grow into 
employing significant number of skilled people in specialized and more general 
government departments. Opportunity costs have already been experiences at national 
and global level as the ineffective negotiation in the Doha round by many is assigned to 
inability of number of countries to focus equally on both – multilateral and preferential – 
fronts. There are also other sources of costs as important social, economic and political 
areas could become neglected because of the policy focus on the preferential trade 
negotiations. While it is very difficult to build reliable time-series data for proper cost-
benefit analysis of trade liberalization negotiations,  experts opinion is that “expenditure 
incurred on such negotiations is regressive with the smaller countries losing a relatively 
bigger chunk out of the total pie of government expenditure for undertaking regional 
trade ventures” (Chadha, 2005, p.3).  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The late 1990s was a period when Asia and the Pacific were just discovering the 
phenomenon of regionalism as a policy-driven management of their international trade 
and investment. Prior to that time, regionalism had been mostly experienced as a 
spontaneous process (autonomous from policy makers and driven by markets and 
entrepreneurs). This regionalism was also limited to geographical areas where, due to the 
lack of political relations, policy-led regionalism could not have been practiced (e.g., the 
Chinese triangle). From  Box, which compares trade flows in 1980 and 2001, it is clear 
that trade between China and Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan Province of China, (which 
set the direction for intraregional trade) evolved in a short period.  
 
However, recent developments ended this spontaneity – contemporary preferential trade 
in Asia and the Pacific is definitely policy-led and unfortunately often by non-economic 
objectives without wisdom of long-term economic policy design. Notwithstanding the 
fact that PTAs may be completely “appropriate solutions to national policy needs, they 
may confer credibility on policy regimes, help to solve political problems or increase 
competition” (Schiff and Winters, 2003, p.261). However, there are many other situations 
where PTAs unnecessarily increase the economic price payable for non-economic (and 
uncertain) gains and/or increase cost of an inappropriately chosen trade liberalization 
path. Low (2006) suggests that before preferential trade agreements could be harnessed to 
work for global benefits, the PTAs must multiply to such a degree to increase trade costs 
sufficiently for business sector to “overturn the current and growing mosaic of criss-
crossing RTAs and move towards a more rational generalized set of arrangements that 
would come back into a multilateral framework.” This is “multilateralizing regionalism” 
à la Baldwin (2006).34  
   
                                                 
34 Cf.  also Bonapace and Mikic (2005), and (2006). See also Batra (2006) for possible options. 
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This paper clarifies what types of preferential trade agreements are emerging in Asia and 
Pacific, and it establishes the fact that they vary widely in motivation, form, coverage and 
content. The paper finds that  PTAs in Asia and the Pacific leave much to be wished for 
in terms of meeting established criteria for ‘best practice’ or model agreements. Bilateral 
agreements are much preferred to plurilateral or regional ones, while “free” trade areas/ 
agreements are the most frequent form, but they in most cases push achievement of “free” 
trade for several years in future. Increasingly, countries opt for a partnership or 
framework agreement – in principle to signal that either they mean much more than trade 
integration or that they really do not mean serious trade integration but are using the 
format to put together a framework of cooperation in several (non-trade-related) areas. 
More often, the latter is the case. This probably explains to some degree why a number of 
countries sign multiple agreements with the same partners! Analysis has also discovered 
a reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization in merchandise trade and to expose 
other than goods trade areas (including WTO plus) to preferential liberalization. A 
necessary next step is to establish empirically if and by how much this chosen format of 
preferentialism is more costly in terms of transaction and implementation costs.  
 
 
To sum up, often the choice to freer global trade is given through two processes:  
multilateral trade negotiations under the governance of WTO, or a spontaneous process of 
“globalization of regional free trade” (via domino effect). We suggest that the third way, 
increasingly discussed among academics, policy makers, and especially business. It 
involves the creation of a relatively small number of large trading blocs through policy-
led consolidation of binding rules for series of PTAs (currently with heterogeneous rules) 
without trade-diverting effects for those economies left outside. 
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Annex figure 1.  Unweighted average applied tariffs of members in RTAs in 2005 
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Annex table 1:  Comparison of rules of origin applicable to trade between India and Sri Lanka* 
 
FTA between India and Sri Lanka APTA AFTA 
Determination of origin of not wholly obtained products: 
Article 7.a 
…products worked on or processed as a result of 
which the total value of the materials, part or 
produce originating from countries other than 
Contracting parties or of undetermined origin 
used does not  exceed 65% of the f.o.b. value 
and the process of manufacture is performed 
within the territory of the exporting contracting 
party 
Rule 3 (a) 
…products worked on or processes as a result of which 
the total value of the materials, parts or produce 
originating from non-Participating States or of 
undetermined origin used does not exceed 55% of the 
f.o.b. value of the products produced or obtained and 
the final process of manufacture is performed within 
the territory of the exporting participating state  
Rule 8 (a) (ii) 
…products worked on or processed as a result of which the 
total value of the materials, parts or produce originating 
from other countries or of undermined origin used does not 
exceed 60% of the f.o.b. value of the products produced or 
obtained and the final process of manufacture is performed 
within the territory of the exporting contracting state 
(70% for LDC and 65% for Sri Lanka) 
Article 7.b 
Non-originating materials shall be considered to 
be sufficiently worked or processed when the 
product obtained is classified in a heading, at the 
four digit level, of the HCDCS, different from 
those in which all the non-originating materials 
used in its manufacture are classified  
Rule 3(c) Formula: 
%55100
...
≤×+
pricebof
ValueValue OM  
Where M= imported non-originating materials, parts or 
produce; and O=undetermined origin materials, parts 
or produce  (65% for LDC) 
Rule 8 (a) (i)  
The final product is classified in a heading at the 4-digit 
level of the HCDCS differently from those in which all the 
non-originating materials used in its manufacture are 
classified  
 
Article 7.e 
The value of the non-originating materials, parts 
or produce shall be: 
i. the c.i.f. value at the time of importation of the 
materials, parts or produce where this can be 
proven, or 
ii. the earliest ascertainable price paid for the 
materials, parts or produce of undetermined 
origin in the territory of the Contracting Parties 
where the working or processing takes place. 
Rule 3(d) 
The value of the non-originating materials, parts or 
produce shall be: 
i. the c.i.f. value at the time of importation …where 
this can be proven, or 
ii. the earliest ascertainable price paid for…in the 
territory of the participating State where the working or 
processing takes place 
Rule 11 (a) The value of the non-originating materials, 
parts or produce shall be: 
i)The c.i.f. value at the time of importation of the materials, 
parts or produce where this can be proven or 
ii) the earliest ascertainable price paid for the materials, 
parts or produce of undetermined origin in the territory of 
the Contracting States where the working or processing 
takes place 
Cumulation 
Article 8 
The value addition in the territory of the 
exporting contracting party shall not be less than 
25% of the f.o.b. value of the product under 
export, and aggregate value addition in territory 
of the contracting parties is not less than 35% of 
the f.o.b. value of the product under export. 
Rule 4 
The aggregate content originating in the territory of the 
participating states is not less than 60% of its f.o.b. 
value (50 % for the LDC) 
Rule 9 
The aggregate content (value of such inputs plus domestic 
value addition in further manufacture) is not less than 50% 
of the f.o.b. value; The domestic value contents (value of 
inputs originating in the exporting contracting state plus 
domestic value addition in further manufacture in the 
exporting contracting state) is not less than 20% of the 
f.o.b. value; And the final product satisfies the condition of 
change in classification at the 4-digit level CTH 
Source: Compiled from respective rules of origin of each agreement downloadable from APTIAD  
* While these two countries are also members of BIMSTEC (other members include Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, and Thailand), there is no electronically 
accessible legal text of that agreement and furthermore rules of origin are yet to be negotiated so they could not have been included in the above table.  
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Annex table 2:  Average MFN applied tariffs and Bound rates by major sectors in recent years 
 
                   Average Tariff Rate (unweighted in %)  /a Bound Tariff Rate (unweighted in %)         Binding Coverage (in %)  
Code Country/Group  /b Year All Goods Agriculture Manufactures All Goods Agriculture Manufactures All Goods Agriculture Manufactures 
1 Bangladesh 2003 19.5 21.7 19.2 163.8 188.5 35.7 15.8 100.0 3.0 
1 Bhutan 2002 16.6 20.1 16.1             
1 Cambodia 2002 16.4 19.7 15.9             
1 India 2004 28.3 30.0 25.3 49.8 114.5 34.3 73.8 100.0 69.8 
1 Kyrgyz Rep. 2003 5.3 8.8 4.4 7.4 12.3 6.7 99.9 100.0 99.9 
1 Lao PDR 2003 8.6 15.9 8.2             
1 Mongolia 2004 5.0 5.1 5.0 17.6 18.9 17.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 Myanmar 2003 4.8 8.7 4.1 83.6 102.8 22.3 17.3 100.0 4.7 
1 Nepal 2003 13.8 14.0 13.8             
1 Pakistan 2004 15.9 13.9 16.1 52.4 97.1 35.3 44.3 92.6 37.0 
1 Papua New Guinea 2004 6.0 14.9 4.6 31.8 43.2 30.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 Solomon Islands 2003 22.2 34.0 20.5 78.8 70.7 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 Tajikistan 2004 8.0 9.9 7.8             
1 Uzbekistan 2003 10.6 10.8 10.7             
1 Vietnam 2004 13.7 18.1 12.9             
2 Armenia 2004 2.7 7.8 2.0 8.5 14.7 7.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 Azerbaijan 2002 8.7 12.7 8.1             
2 China 2004 10.3 15.0 9.5 10.0 15.8 9.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 Fiji 2004 7.9 10.4 7.5 40.1 40.4 40.0 52.3 100.0 45.0 
2 Georgia 2004 7.8 11.4 6.7 7.2 11.7 6.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2 Indonesia 2004 6.4 8.0 6.1 37.1 47.0 35.6 96.6 100.0 96.1 
2 Iran, Islamic Rep. 2004 17.8 14.3 18.0             
2 Kazakhstan 1998 9.5 9.0 9.5             
2 Malaysia 2003 7.3 2.1 8.1 14.5 12.2 14.9 83.7 99.9 81.2 
2 Maldives 2003 20.2 18.3 20.5 36.9 48.0 35.1 97.1 100.0 96.7 
2 Philippines 2004 7.5 11.8 6.9 25.6 34.7 23.4 66.8 99.4 61.8 
2 Russian Fed. 2002 10.3 10.8 10.1             
2 Sri Lanka 2004 10.2 15.4 9.6 29.8 49.7 19.3 37.8 100.0 28.3 
2 Thailand 2003 14.7 16.2 14.6 25.7 35.5 24.2 74.7 100.0 70.9 
2 Turkey 2004 10.0 42.9 5.0 29.4 60.2 17.5 47.3 100.0 39.3 
2 Turkmenistan 2002 5.1 13.5 3.8             
2 Vanuatu 2002 13.8 15.7 13.5             
3 Brunei 2002 2.6 0.0 3.0 24.3 23.2 24.5 95.3 97.6 95.0 
3 Hong Kong, China 2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.7 100.0 37.5 
3 Macau, China 2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.8 100.0 15.6 
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3 Singapore 2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 9.5 6.3 69.2 100.0 64.5 
4 Australia 2004 4.2 1.1 4.6 9.9 3.2 11.0 97.0 100.0 96.5 
4 Japan 2004 4.7 10.4 3.3 5.0 10.9 3.6 99.6 100.0 99.5 
4 Korea, Rep. 2004 11.9 42.5 6.6 16.1 52.9 10.2 94.4 99.1 93.7 
4 New Zealand 2004 3.2 1.7 3.4 10.3 5.7 11.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 
4 United States 2004 4.3 8.2 3.7 3.6 6.9 3.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Memo Items: Average                     
1-2 
Developing countries 
(134) 
1998-
2004 11.4 15.0 10.8 39.5 53.6 26.0 74.1 99.6 70.2 
1 Low Income (51) 
2000-
2004 13.0 16.4 12.3 60.7 81.0 32.7 68.9 99.1 64.3 
2 Middle Income (83) 
1998-
2004 10.0 13.8 9.4 24.1 33.6 21.2 77.8 99.9 74.5 
                        
3 
High Inc. Non-OECDs 
(13) 
2002-
2004 0.7 0.0 0.8 7.8 8.2 7.7 59.3 99.4 53.2 
4 High Income OECDs (10) 
2003-
2004 5.7 12.8 4.3 9.0 15.9 7.8 98.2 99.8 97.9 
                        
            
Notes: /a Based on simple average of MFN applied tariffs available in the latest year. Product categories are defined by HS    
                 classifications as all goods (HS 01-97), agricultural goods (HS 01-24), and manufacturing goods (HS 25-97).    
            /b Based on the classifications of income in WDI 2006; Figures in penetheses indicate numbers of countries/economies    
                 in the group.           
            /c Include specific tariffs.           
            
Sources: WTO, IDB and CTS CD ROMs 2005 and Trade Policy Review, various issues, 1993-2005;      
                  and World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2005.        
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Annex table 3. Coverage of Agriculture goods in Intra-South Asian preferential trade agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement 
(Reference 
Year) 
Approach 
for Listing 
Concession
s 
Agricultural tariff 
lines eligible for 
concessions 
Preferences as 
a % of MFN 
tariff 
Rules of 
Origin 
Inclusion of NTBs 
 
Conditions on  
Domestic 
Support/Export 
subsidies1) 
Technical 
Cooperatio
n  
Inclusion of  
Services  
SAPTA 
(1999) 
Bilateral 
Negotiations 
(multilaterize
d to all 
members) 
866 
Bangladesh 229, 
Bhutan 61, India 
223, Maldives 30, 
Nepal 141, 
Pakistan 107, Sri 
Lanka 85 
5-20 (LDC 5-30) 
 
40-50% of 
local 
content   
Yes 
Sensitive List 
(Pakistan uses positive 
list for imports from 
India)  
No 
 
Yes No 
Indo-Lanka 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(2000) 
 
Negative list 
Approach 
 
India: 53  
Sri Lanka 23  
 25- 35% 
local 
content  
Yes 
TRQ and Designated 
entry points 
 
India: Tea 
No 
 
Yes No 
Pakistan Sri 
Lanka  Free 
Trade 
Agreement 
(2005) 
Negative List 
Approach 
 
Pakistan 41 
Sri Lanka 21  
Duty Free 
subjected to TRQ 
25-35% 
local 
content  
Yes  
TRQ: Sri Lanka: Rice, 
Potato. Pakistan:-Tea, 
Betel leaves  
No  
 
Yes No 
India-Nepal 
(2002) 
  Duty-free access 
to Indian Market  
 Nepal: 10-20 % 
tariff reductions 
form 10-110% 
tariff bands 
30% 
minimum 
content of 
Nepalese 
or Indian 
products 
TRQ-Quotas allocate to 
Indian State Trading 
Enterprises  
No  No 
India- 
Bhutan:  
(2003) 
    Provisions for Bhutan to 
use NTB  
No  No 
Bangladesh- 
Bhutan 
(2003) 
 Bangladesh: 58 
 
23 % MOP 
(apple and apple 
juice) 
  No  No 
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Annex table 4. Provisions concerning contingent protection to agriculture and technical standards within PTAs 
 
Title Approach to liberalization Anti-dumping Countervailing duties Safeguards Technical standards 
South-East Asia 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) • Positive List: Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Inclusion 
List 
• Tariff reduction (to 0-5 per cent level) 
implemented in ASEAN-6, under way 
in new ASEAN members 
• Further negotiation needed to include 
Highly Sensitive Products List under 
the agreement 
 
n.a. n.a. n.a. (But there is an 
exclusions list) 
Creates the ASEAN Consultative 
Committee for Standards and 
Quality 
ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 
(ACFTA) 
• Positive list 
• Tariff elimination by 2010 for ASEAN-
6 and China; 2015 for New ASEAN 
members 
• Three tracks of tariff reduction: Early 
Harvest Programme (EHP), both for 
negative and positive list); and Normal 
Track and Sensitive Track, only for 
positive list 
• Calls for negotiations for further 
accelerating liberalization 
 
Follow WTO principles Follow WTO principles Follow WTO, allowed 
within five years of 
liberalization  
for up to three3 years 
(plus one-year 
extension) 
n.a. 
Singapore–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA) 
• Negative list 
• Tariff elimination by entry in effect of 
the agreement. 
Within WTO rules. 
Detailed process to 
initiate measures. 
Within WTO rules. Not allowed Based on the previous Mutual 
Recognition Agreement on 
Conformity Assessment and calls 
for harmonization within APEC, 
WTO guidelines. 
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Title Approach to liberalization Anti-dumping Countervailing duties Safeguards Technical standards 
 
 
Singapore–EFTA Free Trade 
Agreement 
 
 
• Positive list of products covered, but 
with exceptions  
• The FTA covers only those products 
falling within Ch. 25 through 97 of HS 
Coding System; fish/other marine 
products; and processed agricultural 
goods 
• Tariff elimination by signing of the 
agreement 
 
 
 
Not allowed, should be 
solved through 
consultation. 
 
 
n.a. 
 
 
For one year only, 
extendable to three 
years. 
 
 
Subject to WTO Agreement on SPS 
Singapore–India Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation 
Agreement 
• Positive list into India, all goods free 
into Singapore 
• Full tariff elimination or reduction by 
2010 
• Further liberalization through 
negotiation 
 
Allowed Following WTO Allowed Cooperation towards mutual 
recognition 
Agreement between Singapore–
Japan for a New-Age Economic 
Partnership (JSEPA) 
• Positive list 
• Full tariff elimination 
• Foresees inclusion of more goods in 
the list 
n.a. Following the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards 
Following the WTO 
Agreement on 
Safeguards 
Calls for mutual recognition, and 
sets out the standards to register 
new conformity assessment bodies 
in the Sectoral Annexes 
Singapore–Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement 
• Positive List 
• Tariff elimination in 10 years. 
• Possible acceleration through 
negotiation 
 
WTO plus According to WTO 
commitments 
According to WTO plus 
some specifications on 
the process 
n.a. 
Agreement between Singapore 
and New Zealand on a Closer 
Economic Partnership 
(ANZSCEP) 
 
• Tariff elimination by the signing of the 
agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
WTO rules, with more 
strict requirements 
Not allowed. Not Allowed Mutual and unilateral recognition 
and harmonization of standards 
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Title Approach to liberalization Anti-dumping Countervailing duties Safeguards Technical standards 
Singapore–United States Free 
Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 
• Positive list and schedule 
• Tariff elimination in 10 years at the 
most (depending on the staging 
category) 
• New products/services can be 
included through negotiation 
 
Allowed under 
domestic law 
principles 
Allowed under domestic 
law principles. 
Allowed, linked to WTO 
Agreement on 
Safeguards 
requirements. 
Enhance cooperation in standards, 
certification and conformity 
assessments 
Thailand–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (TAFTA) 
• Positive list and schedule 
• Tariff elimination by 2010 
• Calls for consultations in order to 
accelerate the schedule 
WTO Agreement on  
Implementation of 
WTO  
Art VI. Time frame: 12 
months  
(Six months for 
seasonal products) 
Accepted, following WTO 
principles. 
Accepted, for up to two 
years.  
Special provisions for 
agricultural products. 
SPS: comply with WTO obligations, 
work towards harmonization and 
setting up a Experts Group. TBT: 
same. 
Thailand–India Framework 
Agreement for Establishing an 
FTA 
• There is an early harvest scheme with 
products to be liberalized in 2004. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Thailand–Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 
Preferential Agreement 
 
• n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Thailand–New Zealand Closer 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
• Positive List 
• Upon entry into force, New Zealand 
will eliminate duties on 5,878 Thai 
products while Thailand will do the 
same for 2,978 export items 
• New Zealand will scrap duties on 
another 697 items by 2010, and on 
858 products on the sensitive list 
including textiles, clothing and shoes 
by 2015. 
 
• Tariff elimination by 2014 
• Tariff elimination acceleration is 
encouraged 
 
Following WTO 
commitments 
Following WTO 
commitments 
Specific requirements 
for bilateral safeguards 
Calls for harmonization 
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Title Approach to liberalization Anti-dumping Countervailing duties Safeguards Technical standards 
Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement (Brunei Darussalam, 
Singapore, New Zealand and 
Chile) 
• Negative approach Following WTO Following WTO Following WTO Calls for cooperation 
China–Hong Kong, China Closer 
Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) 
 
 
 
• Positive List 
• Tariff elimination by 2005 
• Every year, new products can be 
included in the no-tariff list (1 October 
every year) 
Parties commit to not 
applying them on each 
other's goods 
Parties commit to not 
applying them on each 
other's goods 
n.a. n.a. 
China–Macao, China  Closer 
Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) 
 
 
• Positive list, can be reviewed annually 
• Tariff elimination by 2006 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Japan–Mexico Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
 
 
 
• Positive List 
• Tariff elimination in five or seven years 
(particularly for tariff quotas) 
• Accelerated elimination possible 
through consultation 
WTO commitments WTO commitments Allowed, maximum 3 
years 
Cooperation for harmonization 
 
Republic of Korea–Chile Free 
Trade Agreement 
 
• Positive List 
• Tariff elimination in zero, 5, or 10 
years according to schedule (some 
exceptions up to 13 years) 
• Accelerated tariff elimination through 
consultation 
 
Subject to GATT Art VI 
 
Subject to GATT Art VI 
 
Subject to GATT Art XIX 
 
WTO plus 
Source: APTIAD, 2006 as cited in Pasadilla  (2007) 
 
